Does the Role of Observer Countries in the Regional Trade Agreement matter for Intra-Regional Trade? by De Silva, Dakshina Garfield & Lee, Soon-Cheul
  
 
Does the Role of Observer Countries in the Regional Trade Agreement matter for Intra-
Regional Trade? 
Dakshina G. De Silva
*       Soon-Cheul Lee† 
 




This paper investigates the effects of trade by observed economies on the intra-regional trade by SAARC members using PPML gravity models 
with panel data over the period 2008-2014. Eight SAARC members and eight observed countries, including the EU, are analyzed in capturing the 
trade effect of observed economies on intra-regional trade in SAARC. This paper provides an empirical measure of observers’ trade, FDI and 
ODA with SAARC if the exports and imports of observers to/from SAARC have positive or negative signs for intra-regional exports and imports. 
The results show that the exports and imports of observers to SAARC members have positive effects on bilateral exports among the members. 
The FDI of observers reduces the bilateral intra imports in SAARC and ODA also has a negative effect on bilateral exports among the members. 
These results imply that the imports by SAARC members from observer countries increase intra-regional trade in the region. The FDI and ODA 
increase and decrease intra-regional trade in SAARC, respectively, implying that the policies for both FDI inflow from observers and efficient aid 
management are needed to increase regional welfare. The study also recommends that trade between SAARC members and its observers help to 
increase intra-regional trade in SAARC.  
 
 
Keywords: intra-regional trade, the role of observers, regional trade agreement, SAARC, trade 
JEL: F15, F14 
  
                                           
*
 Department of Economics, Lancaster University, Lancaster, LA1 4YX, UK  
†




Regional economic cooperation establishes a regional trade agreement (RTA) to receive 
exclusive benefits from trade creation and trade diversion effects that the RTA generates. 
Many studies have provided theoretical and empirical evidence that the RTA stimulates and 
expands the mutual or intra-regional trade as the RTA grants tariff and non-tariff concessions 
to member countries. Lipsey (1960) argued that a custom union increases intra-bloc trade and 
gives exclusive benefits to the members of the RTA, while trade with non-members would be 
reduced. Schiff (1999) also provides evidence that a preferential trade agreement increases 
mutual trade among the members. 
The complementary trade relations among members are a factor for expanding intra-
regional trade (Chandran 2010). That is, it indicates that, in order to expand intra-regional 
trade, the trade structure would be complementary rather than substitutive. Furthermore, it is 
argued that complementary trade relations lead to relatively less trade diversion effects with 
non-members in regional trade. 
However, there is an argument that it is not easy for intra-regional trade that may link with 
regional economic development as the regional trade agreement consists of developing 
countries (Rajapakse and Arunatilake 1997). India has the largest share of intra-SAARC trade 
while those of the other members are very small and limited in variety. The trade dependence 
of SAARC countries on non-member countries is high due to the similarity of trade products 
of SAARC countries. They usually export primary goods or labor-intensive products such as 
agricultural products, textiles, minerals, and so on. As the similarity of trade goods is 
relatively high among SAARC countries, the trade-creation effects would be small due to the 
substitute structure. However, the export products of SAARC members to developed 
countries are strictly complementary and lead to more trade.  
Thus, the trade with non-members rather than with those in the region is more significant in 
the SAARC region. Moreover, the observer countries of SAARC are the most developed 
countries or highly industrialized countries in the manufacturing sector, and this increases the 
importance of trade with SAARC countries. 
Thus, it is important to examine how trade relations between SAARC members and 
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observer countries are set up in view of regional trade expansion and economic growth 
through trade. If they have a complementary relation rather than a substitutive one, then the 
intra-regional trade among the members will expand. The SAARC countries increase their 
welfare as they expand their trade with observer countries while their trade relations with the 
rest of the world economies decline as the trade diversion effect against third countries is 
diminished. If the substitutive relation is higher than the complementary one, the trade with 
observers and members may be reduced. 
Even though they established an RTA, SAARC members have the least trade diversities 
and low complementary but high substitutive relations among members while they have 
complementary relations and very high variety with observer countries.  
The aim of this study is to investigate whether the trade of SAARC members with 
observers affects intra-SAARC trade positively or negatively. If trade with observers affects 
intra-regional trade, then SAARC members achieve economic development through trade 
with observers. 
This study adopts a similar method to examine the trade relationships between members 
and observers in a regional bloc with the gravity model. The gravity model has been 
frequently applied to analyze international trade relations. However, the scope of much of 
these studies has been limited to investigating trade relations within a region or a trading bloc 
(for example Feenstra et al. 1998, Anderson and van Wincoop 2003, McCallum 1995, and so 
on). Few studies have examined the gravity model against a group of trading partners but 
potential RTA members. Our contribution to the gravity model literature is as follows. 
First, while researchers have extensively examined bilateral trade with a trading partner or a 
group of trading partners, not much has been done to study potential regional trade partners. 
As a result, it is not clear whether gravity bilateral trade variables are more sensitive to 
potential regional trade partners—the observer members who are yet to join the RTA. Many 
studies explore the effect of RTAs or FTAs. Few studies distinguish between members and 
observer members or potential bloc-trade partners.  
Second, the role of multilateral trade agreements is important to the economic integration 
process, but SAARC has received limited attention. There are a few studies that explore trade 
relations in the SAARC region such as Rajapalse and Arunatilake (1997) who analyzed trade 
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barriers to intra-SAARC trade from a Sri Lankan perspective.  
Third, some income variables, such as the difference of incomes or the difference of 
economic growth in terms of per capita incomes, are added in the generalized gravity model. 
These variables have strong economic significance, but are highly correlated and pose multi-
collinearity problems. Estimation of a model with multi-collinear variables leads to inaccurate 
estimation of parameters (Vogelvang 2005). This paper uses the recent panel data technique to 
avoid this multi-collinearity problem that is usually present in the gravity model. 
Fourth, PPML (Poison Pseudo Maximum Likelihood estimator) will be used to remove the 
bias against zero trade and heteroskedasticity. The trade data include many zeroes indicating 
no trade or a small amount trade. If the log of the gravity model is used for estimation, the 
error terms have correlated with the independent variable or have omitted variables problems, 
yielding inconsistent results. In order to solve these problems, Silva and Tenreyro (2006) 
argued that PPML will be used to obtain consistent estimates instead of the log of the gravity 
model.  
Fifth, the study also examines the effects of FDI and ODA flow from observers into 
SAARC member countries on intra-regional trade. The most FDI and ODA inflows to 
SAARC come from observer countries. 
The study finds that the observers’ exports to SAARC member countries have a positive 
impact on bilateral exports among SAARC countries while the others are statistically 
insignificant. These results imply that imports by SAARC members from observer countries 
expand intra-regional trade and the FDI and ODA inflows from observers increase and 
decrease the trade in the region, respectively.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. The second section will discuss trade relations 
between SAARC members and observer countries. The third section presents the empirical 
model and describes the data used for the analysis. The empirical results are shown in the 








II. SAARC trade relations with observer partners 
 
The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is the regional 
intergovernmental organization founded by Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka in 1985 (Afghanistan joined SAARC in 2007). SAARC has nine 
observers: Australia, China, EU, Iran, Japan, Mauritius, Myanmar, South Korea, and USA. 
The objectives of SAARC are to promote regional economic development and integration in 
the region through the principles of the United Nations Charter and Non-Alignment. SAARC 
comprises 2% of the global economy, 23% of the world’s population, and 3% of the world’s 
area as of 2015. It launched the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) in 2006, leading to 
the formation of a Customs Union, Common Market, and Economic Union.  
SAFTA plans to gradually move towards a South Asian Economic Union, but the current 
political and economic relations in the region are not encouraging and it may be difficult to 
achieve this target. Intra-SAARC trade stands at just 7.6% and 3.9% on the share of intra-
regional exports and imports in overall trade in SAARC, respectively. While the total exports 
and imports of SAARC members are, on average, US$ 318 million and US$ 504 million, 
intra-SAARC exports and imports are US$ 24 million and US$ 19 million over 2008-2014. 
However, those of the observers in SAARC are US$ 170 million and US$ 225 million, 
accounting for 53.7% and 44.6% of the total amount of SAARC members’ exports and 
imports, respectively. Among the member countries, India has the most exports and imports 
in the region in terms of both total trade with the world and observers, accounting for 81.7% 
and 79.5% of the total amount, 5.3% and 0.5% of intra-regional trade, and 43% and 32.3% of 
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observers, compared to the total exports and imports of SAARC members. The most 
important country in intra-regional trade is Sri Lanka rather than India. The others are 
relatively dismal. The details are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Average exports and imports of SAARC Members and Observers over 2008~2014 
(Unit: US$ million) 
Country 
Total Trade by Members 
Intra- regional Trade by 
Members 
SAARC Trade by 
Observers 
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports 
Afghanistan 0.45 5.85 0.38 1.50 0.06 1.79 
Bangladesh 23.96 32.34 0.34 3.05 14.74 33.29 
Bhutan 0.39 0.64 0.42 0.58 0.00 0.06 
India 260.61 401.28 17.38 2.89 137.57 163.16 
Maldives 0.12 1.45 0.02 0.31 0.06 0.23 
Nepal 0.88 5.81 0.72 4.20 0.20 0.87 
Pakistan 22.72 41.45 4.14 2.63 11.98 17.92 
Sri Lanka 9.18 15.74 0.93 4.59 5.93 7.73 









Note: The ratio of intra-trade by observers to total trade by members is in parentheses. 
Source: trademap.org 
 
Figure 1 shows the trend of the exports and imports of SAARC members and observers in 
South Asia. The total exports and imports of SAARC members to the world economy have 
increased sharply since 2011 and they have deficits in trade. The exports and imports of 
observers to SAARC member countries also show similar trends in the total exports and 









Figure 1: Trend of exports and imports of SAARC members and observers during the period 2008~2014 





Table 2 shows the FDI and ODA flows into SAARC member countries from the world and 
observers. The first and second columns indicate the net FDI inflow and total FDI inflow 
from the world economy and SAARC observer countries. The most beneficial country for 
FDI and ODA is India and the second Bangladesh and Pakistan even though they are 
relatively small compared to India’s values. The others are very dismal. The third and fourth 
columns are Net ODA from the world and observer countries, respectively. The most 
beneficial country for ODA from the world economy is Afghanistan and India from observers. 
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The ODA from observer countries to SAARC member countries accounts for most of the 
total ODA from the world, implying that the observer countries are important for ODA 
inflow in the region. 
 




NetFDI from the 
world 
FDI Inflow from 
Observers 
World Observers 
Afghanistan 0.66 2.71 5.98 1.12 
Bangladesh 15.14 300.25 1.63 1.26 
Bhutan 0.28 0.00 0.13 1.36 
India 302.60 11,395.00 2.50 1.59 
Maldives 2.51 7.09 0.05 1.34 
Nepal 0.55 2.65 0.84 1.27 
Pakistan 19.44 291.17 0.02 1.14 
Sri Lanka 7.08 -9.92 0.57 1.15 
Total 348.26 11,988.96 11.73 10.22 
Note: The FDI and ODA of observers to SAARC are the flow, not stock or net amount. The ODA are from only the 
OECD countries. All values are in US $ in millions.  
Source: FDI come from UNCTAD (http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/FDI-Statistics-
Bilateral.aspx)              and ODA comes from WDI and OECD (http://stats.oecd.org) 
 
 
III. Empirical Model and Data 
 
1. Empirical Model 
To explain the trade relations between regional trade partners (bloc members) and the 
potential members (observers) in the region, the traditional gravity model is applied. 
Timbergen (1962) proposed the following gravity equation: 
                                                           (1) 
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Where         is the bilateral trade amount between countries  and   at time t,       and 
      are the GDP or market size of countries   and   at time t, and       is the distance or 
trade cost between the two countries   and  .  
Frankel (1992) extends the traditional equation (1) further with the difference of per capita 
GDP and growth as the proxies for country size, development stage, or resource endowment 
difference. 
The traditional gravity model shows that bilateral trade expands as of the large difference 
of economic size or market size, the nearer distance, the small difference of the endowments, 
and the greater similarity of economy. These variables have strong economic significance and 
many studies have adopted the model (Feenstra 2004, Head and Mayer 2014, Anderson 
2011). 
The gravity model is generalized for use in terms of logarithms, but it generates biased 
results due to the characteristics of trade data (Martin and Pham 2015, Silva and Tenreyro 
2006). Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) argue that estimates of the traditional gravity 
model could be biased as the models ignore multilateral resistance factors (MRFs) such as 
trade agreements, common language, common colonial experience, remoteness, and 
adjacency. To quantify the impacts of MRFs on bilateral trade, Anderson and van Wincoop 
(2003) asserted that fixed effect estimation methods are used. Several authors use alternative 
approaches to capture the MRFs or country-specific effects for a panel of trading partners. 
Silva and Tenreyro (2006) argue that PPML (Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood method) 
obtains consistent results while it solves the heteroskedasticity and measurement error. 
Related studies are Sukanuntathum (2012), Melitz (2003), Martin and Phan (2015), Shepherd 
(2010), and Anderson and Yotov (2012).  
In line with the recent development in the estimation of the panel gravity model 
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concerning these factors, this study adopts the following trade gravity model: 
 
                                                            
 5   .       + 6   .       + 7   .      + 8   .      +         (2) 
 
            ,         ,          , and         denote the distance, the common border, 
the common official language, and the common colonial experience between the member 
countries   and   in SAARC.            denotes the aggregated export from observer 
members to SAARC country  , and            is the aggregated import of observers from 
SAARC country i.            and            are the aggregated FDI and ODA inflows 
from observers to SAARC country i, respectively.  
The coefficient of lnDistance is expected to be a negative sign. As the distance between the 
two countries is far, the transport cost or trade cost of the two countries increases. The Config, 
Comlang and Comcol are expected to have a positive impact on bilateral trade flows because 
of the similarities between the countries which reduce trade barriers between the countries or 
reduce intra-trade barriers.  
The exports of observers may have a positive or negative sign. If the exports of observers 
have a positive impact on bilateral trade with SAARC members, then they increase the trade 
volume and work as a complementary force. However, if it has a negative effect on intra-
regional trade, it plays a substitutive role in intra-regional trade in the bloc.  
We assume that observer countries are relatively or highly industrialized more than 
SAARC member countries that mostly have trade with observer countries while the rest of 
world is not much related with SAARC members in terms of trade. In such a scenario, trade 
with observers plays an important role in the region. The intra-regional trade is replaced or 
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substituted by that of observers.  
 
Table 3. The trade relations between Observers and RTA member countries 
 RTA (SAARC) Countries 
Intra-regional Export 




to the Bloc 
+ or 0 + or - 
Import 
from the Bloc 
+ or - + or 0 
 
First of all, we take a look at the effects of the exports of observer countries to the Bloc. If 
the observers’ exports to the Bloc have a positive effect on intra-regional exports in the Bloc, 
the observers’ exports have a complementary effect on intra-regional trade. The members 
may import capital goods and major components or parts from observers (which are 
relatively industrialized) and they export final goods using imported products to other 
members though the RTA which cuts or eliminates tariffs in the region. Observers’ exports 
might not have a negative effect on intra-regional exports, so that they might be insignificant.  
Observers’ exports have a complementary or substitutive relationship to observers’ imports 
from members if a member imports from observers such items as capital goods and 
components or parts to make final goods while the country imports raw materials with RTA 
concession rates from members which are relatively cheap and abundant. This makes for a 
positive relationship between observers’ exports and bilateral imports between members. 
Observers’ exports to the Bloc work negatively to affect bilateral imports in the region when 
the bilateral imports substitute imports from observers. Observers’ products might be cheaper 
and better quality than those of members. For example, Chinese products are cheaper and 
better than those of SAARC members. This case has a substitutive effect on bilateral imports 
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in the region. 
Second, observers’ imports from the Bloc have a complementary or substitutive 
relationship with bilateral exports and imports between members in the region. If a member 
has the capability to produce and export goods to observers, then the country also exports its 
products to other members. However, as the country exports products such as raw materials 
or natural resources to observers, the country may reduce its exports to members due to their 
scarcity. The former will have a positive sign, but the latter will have a negative sign for 
bilateral exports between members.  
When a member exports its products to observers, it needs more components or raw 
materials and procures them from within the region. This leads to more bilateral imports 
between members, resulting in a positive sign. 
Observers’ FDI and ODA have positive or negative signs. If the FDI and ODA help to 
expand intra-regional trade, they will have positive signs, but negative signs otherwise.  
 
2. Data 
This study analyses the effects of observers’ trade on the bilateral trade flow among 
SAARC members over the period 2008 to 2014 for eight members and eight observers. 
Appendix A lists the countries analyzed. Table 1 also describes the variables and data sources. 
The data of exports and imports come from the International Trade Center. Distance, 
contiguity, common official language, and colonial link between the two countries are from 
the CEPII institute. The data for FDI and ODA come from the database in UNCTAD and 
OECD. The FTA data are from the WTO, which lists agreements that have been officially 





Table 4: Variables Description and Data Source 
Variables  Description and Sources 
 
           Bilateral merchandise export among SAARC members in US 
Billion $. (ICT) 
          Bilateral merchandise import among SAARC members in US 
Billion $. (ICT) 
         Log distance between i and j countries of SAARC (CEPII) 
           Total exports of observers to SAARC countries in US Billion $. 
(ICT) 
           Total imports of observers from SAARC countries in US Billion $. 
(ICT) 
           Total FDI inflow of observers to SAARC countries in US Million $. 
(UNCTAD) 
           Total FDI inflow of observers to SAARC countries in US Million $. 
(OECD) 
Config 1 if the two countries in SAARC share a common border or zero 
otherwise(CEPII) 
Comlang 1 if the two countries in SAARC share a common official language 
or zero otherwise (CEPII) 
Comcol 1 if the two countries have ever had a colonial link, 0 otherwise 
(CEPII) 
PAK-CHN FTA Pakistan and China FTA(WTO), since 2008, Pakistan=1 or zero 
otherwise 
IND-KOR FTA India and Korea FTA(WTO), since 2010. India=1 or zero  
otherwise 
IND-JAN FTA India and Japan FTA (WTO), since 2011. India=1 or zero  
otherwise 
APTA Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement(WTO), 1 if countries are 
Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka or zero otherwise, since 2004 
Note: ITC-International Trade Center, https:trademap.org 
UNCTAD-United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
CEPII- Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales, http://www.cepii.fr. 
WTO-World Trade Organization, http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx 
 
Table 5 provides summary statistics for these eight SAARC members and eight observers. 
On average, the bilateral merchandise export and import values among SAARC members are 
about $3 billion and $2.5 billion per country, respectively. Similarly, the total value of 
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observers’ exports and imports to/from SAARC are $189.9 billion and $260 billion per 
country, respectively. The total value of observers’ FDI inflow and ODA inflow to SAARC 
members are $1.5 billion and 0.01 billion, respectively. In the next section, the empirical 
results are presented. 
 
Table 5: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Exports 392.0  3.0  8.4  0.0  59.5  
Imports 392.0  2.5  7.0  0.0  45.7  
lnDistance 392.0  7.4  0.7  5.9  8.1  
Obs.EXP 392.0  189.9  423.9  0.0  1624.5  
Obs.IMP 392.0  260.6  502.6  0.1  1744.8  
Obs.FDI 392.0  1498.6  4583.6  -    245.2  18785.3  
Obs.ODA 392.0  0.011  0.013  0.000  0.051  
 
IV. Empirical Results 
This section provides the empirical results from the gravity models of the observer effects 
on export and import flows in the RTA. Table 6 presents the regression estimates of the 
PPML models on bilateral exports among SAARC members. The first column shows the 
exports and imports of observers on bilateral exports or intra-regional exports among SAARC 
members. The second column shows the estimated results for the observers’ FDI and ODA 
inflow effects on bilateral exports, and the third column shows the effect of observers’ RTA 
with SAARC members on bilateral exports in the RTA bloc. 
The gravity models have a very good fit for the natural distance (lnDistance). The three 
estimated coefficients are significant and negative as expected at the 1% or 5% confidence 
level and imply that bilateral trade decreases as trade cost increases. 
The trade cost variables have very interesting signs that seem to have positive impacts. The 
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common border (Config) is statistically insignificant (except for the first column) and the 
coefficient of the common language (Comlang) has a negative sign at the 1% confidence 
level. This is because of the relationship between India and Pakistan that have a common 
language. The political relationship between the two countries is very conflicted and the 
economic link between the two countries is also very weak (the two countries have yet to sign 
the MFN agreement). The relations between the two countries may preclude and negatively 
affect bilateral trade. The common experience of having been colonized (Comcol) has 
positive signs because most SAARC members have experienced British colonization. 
Now, we turn to the effects of observers’ exports to SAARC members on bilateral exports 
within SAARC. The coefficients of observers’ exports to SAARC members are positively 
significant, providing evidence that observers’ exports to SAARC members increase intra-
regional exports within SAARC. This suggests that SAARC members may export their 
products to one another as they import capital goods from observers (that are relatively 
industrialized countries) and export processed products to their neighbors. It implies that the 
observers’ exports play a complementary role in increasing intra-SAARC trade. 
The coefficient of observers’ imports from SAARC members, however, is insignificant. 
This means that SAARC members don’t have any supply value chains in the region to export 
their products to observers because they export mostly primary articles to observers.
‡
 
The coefficients of observers’ FDI and ODA to SAARC members have positive and 
negative signs at the 10% and 1% confidence level, respectively. Although the coefficient of 
the observers’ FDI is positive, it is very small (almost zero), indicating that it does not have a 
significant effect on bilateral exports. The ODA has a negative sign, suggesting that the 
                                           
‡
There are some studies that show that products produced in the region do not satisfy demand within the region. 
For example, India—a relatively industrialized country in the region—does not supply capital goods and durable 
goods to the region because of quality problems (see Kelegama 1994).   
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inflow of observers’ ODA into the region reduces intra-regional trade in the region.§ This 
implies that the ODA policies may be poor in SAARC region.  This is also in line with 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) who pointed out that aid has no positive effect on growth in the 
presence of poor policies. 
For the FTA between observers and individual SAARC members—the Pakistan-China 
FTA and the India-Korea & India-Japan FTAs—show positive and negative signs at the 1% 
confidence level, implying that the FTA between Pakistan and China increases intra-regional 
trade in the bloc, but the FTAs between India and Korea or Japan reduce intra-regional 
exports. The APTA is insignificant due to the minimal trade among the APTA members. 
Table 7 provides the results of estimating the gravity model with PPML for imports from 
observers to SAARC members. The result of the distance is inconsistent with the gravity 
model as the coefficients are all insignificant. The coefficient of the common border, which 
was insignificant in previous estimates of exports, is now turning into a positive sign. 
Common language has a negative sign, which is consistent with the above results. The 
coefficients of the common colonial experience have positive signs. 
Considering the role of observers’ exports to and imports from SAARC members, the 
observers’ exports are insignificant. Observers’ imports from SAARC members are also 
insignificant. 
Observers’ FDI and ODA are also insignificant, implying that observers’ FDI and ODA 
flows to SAARC members have not played any role in increasing intra-regional trade. All the 
coefficients of FTAs are insignificant. The results suggest that FTAs between individual 
SAARC members and observers do not cause an increase in intra-regional imports. 
                                           
§
 Many studies have shown the negative effects of ODA on GDP and Investment. Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz (2007) 
show a negative correlation between ODA and GDP. Easterly et al. (2004) also find that aid has a negative effect 




Table 6: The effect of observers on bilateral exports in SAARC 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Exports Exports Exports 
    
lnDistance -1.3407*** -1.1548** -1.3365*** 
 (0.3821) (0.4521) (0.4735) 
Contig 1.4971** 0.8405 0.5694 
 (0.7460) (0.6676) (0.6877) 
Comlang -3.9431*** -1.8068*** -2.0770*** 
 (0.5134) (0.4173) (0.3986) 
Comcol 4.7632*** 1.6691*** 1.8212*** 
 (0.6423) (0.4104) (0.5094) 
Obs.EXP 0.0010*** 0.0025*** 0.0036*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0004) 
Obs.IMP 0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0000 
 (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0007) 
PAK-CHN FTA   1.5848** 
   (0.6198) 
IND-KOR FTA   -0.4787** 
   (0.1906) 
IND-JAP FTA   -1.1618*** 
   (0.2580) 
APTA   -0.2234 
   (0.8490) 
Obs.FDI  0.0000**  
  (0.0000)  
Obs.ODA  -9.2006***  
  (1.7194)  
Constant 7.9077*** 7.5135** 7.7779*** 
 (2.8259) (3.1700) (2.9660) 
Observations 392 392 392 
R-squared 0.9486 0.6616 0.7300 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 






Table 7: The effect of observers on bilateral imports in SAARC 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Imports Imports Imports 
    
lnDistance -0.0474 -0.0453 -0.1312 
 (0.2652) (0.2654) (0.2205) 
Contig 2.6176*** 2.6180*** 2.5523*** 
 (0.6774) (0.6780) (0.6921) 
Comlang -0.7337** -0.7332** -0.1080 
 (0.3595) (0.3590) (0.4969) 
Comcol 1.3896** 1.3839** 1.1714*** 
 (0.6217) (0.6177) (0.3539) 
Obs.EXP 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0012) 
Obs.IMP -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0012 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0015) 
PAK-CHN FTA   -0.6218 
   (0.5903) 
IND-KOR FTA   -0.2297 
   (0.4796) 
IND-JAP FTA   0.4516 
   (0.8581) 
APTA   0.4081 
   (0.3754) 
Obs.FDI  -3.1347  
  (3.2271)  
Obs.ODA -0.3171 -0.3062 0.4180 
 (2.0118) (2.0200) (1.6393) 
Observations 392 392 392 
R-squared 0.2689 0.2682 0.2604 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
V. Conclusion 
The RTA plays a role in increasing intra-regional trade in the bloc. However, an RTA 
among developing countries such as SAARC members might not play a significant role in 
active intra-regional trade when the volume of trade between members is small, but that with 
observers is relatively large. This paper began with the question: Does the trade of observers 
with RTA members increase intra-regional trade in a region like SAARC? This paper 
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empirically analyzes how the economic cooperation of observers with an RTA’s members 
affects intra-regional trade. The exports, imports, FDI, and ODA of eight observer countries 
with eight SAARC member countries are used for empirical analyses with PPML. Few 
studies investigate the observers’ effect on intra-regional trade in an RTA, and previous 
studies have mostly focused on intra-regional trade among RTA members or members versus 
non-members. 
This paper finds that observers’ exports to SAARC members have positive effects on intra-
regional exports. As SAARC members import capital goods from observers, they use the 
imported goods to expand their exports to other region members. SAARC members’ exports 
to observers might also increase bilateral imports as they export primary goods to observers.  
FDI inflows into SAARC from observers increase bilateral exports in the region, but ODA 
decreases bilateral exports within SAARC. The FTAs between SAARC members and 
observers have positive and negative effects on bilateral exports within the bloc.  
These results suggest that, in order to increase exports within SAARC, SAARC members 
import capital goods to expand production from relatively highly industrialized observer 
countries. This means that the export capability of SAARC members is the most important 
factor in expanding intra-regional trade. They also need more powerful policies to induce 
investment from observers. However, a more efficient management system for ODA needs to 
be introduced. FTAs with developing observers could expand intra-SAARC trade, while 





Anderson, J. E., & van Wincoop, 2003, “Gravity with gravitas: A solution to the border 
puzzle,” American Economy Review 93(10), pp.170-192 
Anderson, J. E and Y. Yotov, 2012, "Gold standard gravity" Working Paper 17835, National 
Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. 
Anderson, James E. and E. van Wincoop, 2003, “Gravity with gravitas: a solution to the 
border puzzle,” American Economic Review 93(1) (March), pp.170–192. 
Burndise, C. and D. Dollar, 1999, “Aid, Policies, and Growth,” American Economic Review 
90(4), pp.847-868. 
Easterly, William, Ross Levine, and David Roodman, 2003, “New Data, New Doubts: A 
Comment on Burnside and Dollar’s ‘Aid, Policies, and Growth’.” NBER Working 
Paper 9846. 
Ezemenari, K. E. Kebede & Labiri, S., 2008, “The Fiscal Impact of Foreign Aid in Rwanda: 
A Theorectical and Empirical Analysis,” Policy Research Working Paper 4541. 
World Bank. 
Feenstra, R, C., Markusen, J, R., & Rose, A. K., 1998, “Understanding the home market 
effect and the gravity equation: The role if differenctiating goods,” NBER Working 
Paper Series 6804. 
Feenstra, Robert, 2004, Advanced International Trade. Princeton University Press. 
Frankel 1992 
Head, K. and T. Mayer, 2014, “Gravity equations: workhorse, toolkit and cookbook,” In: 
Gopinath, Helpman, Rogoff (Eds.), Handbook of International Economics 4, pp.131-
201. 
Kalegama, J. B., 1994, “Will the SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement Expand Mutual 
Trade in South Asia?” Economic Review (May/June), pp.45-49. 
Lipsey, R., 1960, “The theory of customs unions: A general survey,” Economic Journal 70, 
pp.498–513. 
Martin, W. and C. S. Pham, 2015, “Estimating the Gravity Model When Zero Trade Flows 
Are Frequent and Economically Determined,” World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper 7308. 
McCallum, J., 1995, “National borders matter: Canada-US regional trade pattern,” The 
21 
 
American Economic Review 85(3), pp.615-623. 
Melitz, M., 2003, "The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and aggregate industry 
productivity."Econometrica 71(6), pp.1695-725. 
Rajapakse, R. and N. Arunatilake, 1997, “Would a Reduction in Trade Barriers Promotion 
Intra-SAARC Trade?: A Sri Lanka Perspective,” Journal of Asian Economic 8(1), 
pp.95-115. 
Lueth, Erik and Marta Ruiz-Arranz. 2007, “Are Workers’ Remittances a Hedge Against 
Macroeconomic Shocks? The Case of Sri Lanka.” IMF Working Paper WP/07/22. 
Shepherd, B., 2010, "Geographical diversification of Developing Country exports."World 
Development 38(9), pp.1217–28. 
Silva, J. M. C. and S. Tenreyro, 2006, “ The Log of Gravity,” The Review of Economics and 
Statistics 88(4), pp.641-658. 
Sukanuntathum, A., 2012, “Robust Estimation of Gravity Models under Heteroskedasticity 
and Data Censoring,” Prodcdeia-Social and Behavioral Sciences 40, pp.731-735. 
Timbergen, 1962, Shaping the world economy: suggestions for an international economy 
policy, The twenty century fund, New York. 





Appendix A: The lists of countries.  







Pakistan S. Korea 
Sri Lanks USA 
 
